Only 12 more negotiating days remain until WHO member states hit the May 2026 deadline for an agreement on a Pathogen Access and Benefit Sharing (PABS) system, as part of the new Pandemic Agreement adopted at last year’s World Health Assembly (WHA). 

The gap between developed and developing blocs of countries remains large, and progress has been slow in bridging the divide. A bloc of approximately 100 low-and middle-income countries (LMICs) continues to call for mandatory benefit sharing, including guaranteed LMIC access to vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics (VTDs) as the price of their rapid sharing of information on novel pathogens that might pose a pandemic risk.  

High-income countries, on the other hand, remain focused on protecting the pharma innovation ecosystem and ensuring open pharma access to pathogen sequence data. In terms of benefit-sharing, they tend to favor more flexible and voluntary commitments by manufacturers and research institutions to share products and manufacturing know-how with LMICs. 

While some elements of the PABS might actually be settled in time for adoption at  this year’s 79th WHA (18-23 May), other issues are likely to be kicked further down the road, potentially to a future Pandemic Agreement Conference of Parties (COP).  

In the seventh issue of the Governing Pandemics Snapshot, Daniela Morich dissects the choices facing member states.

On 20 May 2025, the global health community welcomed the adoption of the Pandemic Agreement (PA) as a much-needed triumph of multilateralism in a year marked by significant challenges and strains on global cooperation.

Although adopted, the Agreement will not be opened for signature until a supplementary Annex on the Pathogen Access and Benefit Sharing (PABS) system is completed—an uncommon feature in international law that temporarily halts the Agreement’s progress toward entry into force until the details of the Annex are agreed.

At the core of the Annex lies a longstanding tension: how to ensure rapid and reliable sharing of pathogens and their genetic sequence data – crucial for managing health emergencies and for the development of health products – while also guaranteeing fair and meaningful access to the benefits derived from their use, such as vaccines and therapeutics.  

Article 12 of the PA sets out the foundational principles of the PABS system. But the specifics – such as the recognition of obligations for countries and manufacturers, benefit-sharing arrangements, and implementation mechanisms – remain to be negotiated. An ad hoc Intergovernmental Working Group (IGWG), open to all WHO member states, has been tasked with translating these principles into operational rules.

Wide divide from the start

The IGWG officially began its work in mid-2025. In August, WHO Member States submitted 17 textual proposals reflecting the views of approximately 100 countries. These proposals revealed, from the outset, deep divergences in how countries imagine the PABS System, and those differences have continued to shape the negotiations ever since.  

Developing countries advocate for strong equity provisions, including mandatory benefit-sharing and guaranteed access to vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics (VTDs). Their approach relies on transparency and traceability, with a strong role for WHO in administering the system and oversight by a future Conference of the Parties (COP).

Developing country blocs also have placed a greater emphasis  on technology transfer, and as part of that, licensing of medicines and vaccines as core benefits they should reap from the PABS agreement. As such, their proposals prioritize binding obligations operationalized through contractual mechanisms to ensure traceability and enforceability of commitments and to support the development of regional production capacity.

Consistent with this approach, the leading LMIC negotiating blocs, known as the Africa Group and the Group for Equity, as well as Egypt, Libya, Somalia and Sudan jointly submitted an ad hoc proposal for draft contractual agreements for negotiation (see Adam Strobeyko’s piece Avoiding Contract Fatalism.).

High-income countries, by contrast, focus on protecting the innovation ecosystem, maintaining open access to pathogen sequence data, and preserving incentives for private-sector research and development, which is still mainly happening in the Global North.

With regards to benefit-sharing obligations, they tend to favor voluntary and flexible commitments for manufacturers and research institutions. Their concern is that overly rigid obligations could undermine scientific collaboration or discourage investment in pandemic-related technologies.

First draft text does not bridge divides

In October 2025, the IGWG’s Bureau, a six-person panel steering the negotiations, released the first Draft Text of the Annex ahead of the Group’s third meeting. Although the text drew significant criticism from many delegations, it nonetheless became the basis for negotiations during the two subsequent meetings in November and December.

Progress was extraordinarily slow. Delegations used the sessions not to narrow differences but to reinsert the language they considered had been omitted from the Bureau’s proposal. As a result, the document expanded from seven pages to 37, producing a dense and unwieldy “rolling text” in which every proposal reappeared.

The only areas where common ground emerged were a few preliminary words on governance elements, notably that the COP would oversee the PABS System and that a PABS Advisory Group would be created.

Following calls for more transparency in the proceedings, the second IGWG meeting marked a surprising shift by deciding, on a pilot basis, to invite stakeholders to observe discussions starting at IGWG3 in November 2025. 

However, this openness was quickly revoked at the beginning of IGWG3, with no access to the negotiating room granted to observers. Further constraints on meaningful participation were introduced in January 2026, when participation was limited to virtual attendance. It is hoped that greater transparency will be allowed as the process moves forward.

Revising the Draft: Gains Limited to Pathogen Definition

In the fourth resumed session of the IGWG (20–22 January 2026), progress remained slow. The Bureau, following regular intersessional informal meetings, released a revised draft text.

Some advancement was seen in clarifying language on the definition of “pathogen with pandemic potential,” an important step in defining the system’s scope, but little progress was made elsewhere in the text. Despite a generally positive mood in the room, the ticking clock reinforced a sense of urgency. Progress in bridging the divides continues to be painfully slow.

A small but highly engaged group of relevant stakeholders continues to follow the process closely, although it remains state-led and conducted behind closed doors. Interaction with delegates is limited to short briefings led by the Bureau and is restricted to stakeholders duly accredited to the process.

Are we nearing the finish line?

With the May 2026 deadline approaching – and only 12 actual negotiation days remaining – clear divergences between blocs of countries remain a significant obstacle. 

Additionally, while some issues—such as laboratory networks, databases, and traceability—have been discussed, other critical topics, including financing, have yet to be meaningfully addressed, as highlighted by Suerie Moon in her companion article “Could money grease the wheels of compromise on PABS?”

Against the ticking clock, an overarching  question now looms: which elements of the PABS  parties might be willing to settle now –  and which they might further kick down the road to a future Pandemic Agreement’s COP.

Problematically, these negotiations also unfold against the backdrop of a spate of US  bilateral agreements with  developing countries – so far 15 in all. In these arrangements, seen as a cornerstone of the new US global health policy, aid and commercial deals are offered in exchange for access to pathogen samples and data about disease outbreaks. 

Some experts worry that these deals will negatively affect the negotiations in Geneva, and the future PABS systems, as they could create structural dependency that constrains a country’s ability to share data independently with regional or WHO-coordinated networks.

With only a few months remaining, parties will need to be realistic about what can be achieved. Successfully concluding this work would consolidate years of effort and strengthen the foundations of a more equitable global pandemic preparedness and response system.

Daniela Morich is head of policy engagement and Global Health Platform at the Geneva Graduate Institute’s Global Health Centre.

Three other articles are available in the seventh issue of the Governing Pandemics Snapshot:

In  “Avoiding Contractual Fatalism: Lessons from PIP Framework for Standardising PABS contracts” Adam Strobeyko looks at how the experience of the Pandemic Influence Preparedness (PIP) Framework could help inform the PABS process. He examines WHO contracts that enable pharma access to a global network of influenza samples in exchange for benefit-sharing commitments channelled through WHO.

In PABS laboratory networks: building a new system or using what we have? Gian Luca Burci examines whether existing WHO-managed networks, such as the Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS), could take on the additional role of a PABS laboratory network, presuming an agreement is reached.

Finally, in her piece, Could money grease the wheels of compromise on PABS? Suerie Moon explores how finance for Access and Benefit Sharing (ABS) could be generated in “interpandemic” times when the absence of a clear pandemic threat provides limited incentive to pharma companies to invest in related products.